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47 
Article 
 
The Peril of Imposing the Rule of Law: Lessons 
From Liberia 
 
By Jonathan Compton
†
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Deep in the jungle of Liberia, tribal elders have gathered to 
settle disputes. First is a man who accuses his neighbor of 
stealing his goat. The neighbor insists that he did not steal the 
animal and that it must have wandered off. The elders force the 
alleged thief to drink poison. If he is telling the truth he will 
live; if he is lying he will die. 
Next is a woman who alleges that she was raped by 
another villager. Under the supervision of the elders, the 
parents of both parties discuss the situation. They determine 
that the alleged rapist’s family should pay the victim’s family 
forty-eight dollars. The families share a common meal and 
agree to put the matter behind them. The alleged rapist and 
victim continue to farm next to each other. 
Miles away in the capital city Monrovia, a reform-minded 
government is considering how to strengthen the rule of law. 
While the nation has a Western justice system, it was 
devastated by a recent civil war and remains weak in rural 
areas where locals prefer traditional practices. The government 
and its international partners are eager to fix this problem. 
They pour money into the formal justice system, outlaw 
 
†
 Jonathan Compton is an Assistant Professor of Law at the United 
States Air Force Academy and a Judge Advocate in the United States Air 
Force. This paper stems from the author’s experience leading a research team 
to Liberia in 2012 to study post-civil war challenges to the rule of law. The 
views expressed here do not represent the views of the Judge Advocate 
General’s Corps, the United States Air Force, or the Department of Defense. 
The author would like to thank the staff of the Minnesota Journal of 
International Law for their helpful edits, Lt Col Jeremy Marsh for his 
encouragement, and the author’s family for their support as he conducted 
research at home and abroad. 
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traditional practices, and focus on promoting human rights. 
The rule of law is strengthened. Or is it? 
The United States and the United Nations are regularly 
involved in post-conflict reconstruction and rule of law 
missions.
1
 Often, this encompasses strengthening or even 
creating the justice system.
2
 Those involved in reconstruction 
generally assume the inherent superiority of Western systems 
or international standards, and favor these over traditional 
practices.
3
 While these systems and standards may be superior 
to certain customary practices, the imposition of a Western-
style system will not always strengthen the rule of law. In fact, 
imposition may actually undermine the rule of law. Liberia 
provides an example. 
The modern Republic of Liberia began with grand 
intentions — free African Americans immigrating to Africa to 
 
 1. See SHAWNA WILSON, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., U.S. RULE OF LAW 
ASSISTANCE: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2011), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/RulLaw11.pdf/$file/RulLaw11.pdf 
(reviewing the U.S. government agencies supporting rule of law reform); 
United Nations and the Rule of Law, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (explaining how 
over forty UN entities are engaged in rule of law work in over 110 countries, 
many of which are in “conflict and post-conflict situations”). 
 2. See, e.g., Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, Rule of Law Programs in Afghanistan Fact Sheet, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF STATE (May 4, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/189320.htm 
(discussing U.S. efforts to help Afghanistan “develop a formal justice sector” 
and to “train and build capacity” for the Afghan system). 
 3. While the UN acknowledges the role of informal justice mechanisms, 
its approach is to further “the implementation of international norms and 
standards.” Informal Justice, UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW, 
http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=30 (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
Additionally, the U.S. definition of “rule of law” assumes a separation of 
powers and adherence to international human rights law. See U.S. AGENCY 
FOR INT’L DEV., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SECURITY SECTOR 
REFORM 4 (2009) (available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization 
/115810.pdf) (“Rule of [l]aw is a principle under which all persons, institutions, 
and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to 
laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights law.”) 
(footnote omitted). The UN definition is the same. See U.N. Secretary-General, 
The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 
2004) (“[The rule of law] refers to a principle of governance in which all 
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State 
itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced 
and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international 
human rights norms and standards.”). 
Compton Article 2/27/2014  6:11 PM 
2014] LESSONS OF RULE OF LAW IN LIBERIA 49 
 
create their own community.
4
 The settlers brought with them a 
Western adversarial justice system and patterned their 
constitution and laws after those found in the United States.
5
 
This type of justice system, however, was foreign to the 
indigenous population who had well-established customary 
justice practices.
6
 A dual justice system emerged as the 
indigenous population continued to use traditional practices 
despite disapproval by the national government.
7
 The different 
views of how the justice system should work contributed to the 
growing tensions between the groups. The heightened tensions 
between the groups ultimately led to a horrific civil war from 
1989 to 2003.
8
  
After the war, Liberia’s new government began to rebuild 
with the assistance of the international community.
9
 Concerned 
that customary justice practices violated international 
standards, the government and its partners attempted to 
strengthen Liberia’s formal justice system.
10
 The majority of 
 
 4. See JOHN-PETER PHAM, LIBERIA: PORTRAIT OF A FAILED STATE, 5–11 
(2004). 
 5. See Jim Dube, Resurrecting the Rule of Law in Liberia, 60 ME. L. REV. 
575, 576–77 (2008) (explaining how Liberia’s legal system, first constitution, 
and laws were all patterned after those found in the United States). 
 6. See EZEKIEL PAJIBO, INT'L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL 
ASSISTANCE, TRADITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS: THE LIBERIAN CASE 16–22 
(2008) (describing customary justice methods in “pre-settler Liberia”); Dube, 
supra note 5, at 577. Cf. Pewee Flomoku & Lemuel Reeves, Formal and 
Informal Justice in Liberia, ACCORD, Mar. 2012, at 44, 45, available at 
http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/CON1222_Accord_23_9.pdf (explaining 
how “evidence-based due process is largely alien” to rural Liberians today). 
 7. See e.g., Amanda C. Rawls, Policy Proposals for Justice Reform in 
Liberia: Opportunities Under the Current Legal Framework to Expand Access 
to Justice, in CUSTOMARY JUSTICE:  PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT 
91, 104 (Janine Ubink & Thomas McInerney eds., 2011),  available at 
http://www.idlo.org/Publications/CustomaryJustice3.pdf (explaining how the 
Liberian Supreme Court declared all forms of trial by ordeal, one such 
traditional practice, to be unconstitutional in 1940, yet “[i]rrespective of the 
law, many forms of trial by ordeal continue to be practiced throughout the 
country.”). For a further discussion of trial by ordeal, see the section titled 
“The Customary Justice System” below. For a further discussion of the 
emergence of the dual justice system, see the section titled “Historical 
Background” below. 
 8. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 8–11 (discussing the rift between the settlers 
and the indigenous people, how that rift led to a coup, and the years of 
subsequent violence). 
 9. See UNMIL Background, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en 
/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/background.shtml (last visited Sept. 22, 2013) 
(explaining the background of the United Nations Mission in Liberia). 
 10. See Flomoku & Reeves, supra note 6, at 44 (describing the work and 
Compton Article 2/27/2014  6:11 PM 
50 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 23:1 
 
Liberians, however, did not use the formal system and 
continued to prefer customary practices.
11
 Recently, the 
Liberian government has moved away from their policy of 
imposition and began to discuss justice reform with traditional 
leaders.
12
 While not approving of all traditional practices, the 
government is listening to the reasons and values behind 
onerous customs rather than focusing merely on their 
elimination.
13
 This dialogue is ongoing and has great potential 
to strengthen the rule of law without compromising human 
rights standards.
14
 
This article contends that the imposition of a Western 
justice system has been a source of conflict in Liberia and has 
not strengthened the rule of law.
15
 In fact, imposition has been 
the enemy of the rule of law. However, recent efforts to consider 
the reasons and values behind the customary system, rather 
than merely focusing on regulating or eliminating it, have 
eased tensions and shown great potential for strengthening the 
rule of law in Liberia. This provides important lessons for 
future rule of law missions in other nations. 
This article uses the definition of “the rule of law” adopted 
by both the United States and the United Nations: “Rule of 
[l]aw is a principle under which all persons, institutions, and 
entities, public and private, including the state itself, are 
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally 
 
international support directed at strengthening the formal system); Rawls, 
supra note 7, at 96 (explaining how the emphasis on the formal system stems 
from the priorities of, and financing from, the United Nations, United States, 
and other international partners who have a specific justice paradigm and 
“routinely express concern over the protection of human rights”). 
 11. See DEBORAH H. ISSER ET AL., LOOKING FOR JUSTICE:  LIBERIAN 
EXPERIENCES WITH AND PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL JUSTICE OPTIONS, 3–4 (2009). 
 12. See Tim Luccaro, Navigating Liberia’s Justice Landscape, U.S. 
INSTITUTE OF PEACE, (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.usip.org/in-the-
field/navigating-liberias-justice-landscape (discussing the work of the Liberian 
Legal Working Group and its discussions with the Traditional Leadership 
Council). 
 13. See Findings of the Legal Working Group as Adopted on December 10, 
2009, at III.A.3, U.S. INST. FOR PEACE (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.usip.org/in-
the-field/navigating-liberias-justice-landscape (follow “document” hyperlink). 
 14. The details of the government’s new approach, the ongoing dialogue, 
and the potential it creates are discussed in detail in Part III below. 
 15. This article uses the U.S./UN definition of rule of law, which 
encompasses the following principles:  universal accountability, public 
promulgation, equal enforcement, independent adjudication, and consistency 
with international human rights law.  See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., supra 
note 3; The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies:  Rep. of the Secretary-General, supra note 3, at ¶ 6. 
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enforced, and independently adjudicated, and which are 
consistent with international human rights law.”
16 
Relevant 
international human rights laws include the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights Articles 7 through 11 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 
14.
17
 
This article begins with a brief historical background in 
Part I. Part II explains the components of Liberia’s formal and 
customary justice systems, their strengths and weaknesses, 
and which system Liberians prefer. Part III examines how 
Liberia has approached rule of law reform after the civil war 
and its recent shift in perspective. Part IV explains how the 
imposition of the formal system has not strengthened the rule 
of law in Liberia and how Liberia’s new approach shows great 
promise for strengthening the rule of law and reaching 
international standards. Finally, Part V draws some lessons 
from Liberia that can be applied to future rule of law missions. 
 
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Modern Liberia began in 1821 when the American 
Colonization Society (ACS) purchased land on Africa’s Atlantic 
coast for a settlement of free African Americans.
18
 The ACS 
financed the settlement and the transportation of the settlers.
19
 
By 1843, the group had sent 4,571 African American settlers to 
Liberia.
20
 Three years later, the ACS called on the settlers to 
 
 16. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., supra note 3. See U.N. Secretary-
General, supra note 3, at ¶ 6. 
 17. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 18. See PHAM, supra note 4, at 5–11. The ACS was a group of American 
religious, government, and business leaders, including Supreme Court Justice 
Bushrod Washington, Speaker of the House Henry Clay, Congressman Daniel 
Webster, and future president Andrew Jackson.  The member’s motives for 
forming Liberia ranged from encouraging emancipation to keeping freed 
slaves from inciting a slave revolt. Id. at 7. 
 19. Id. at 5–11. 
 20. Id. at 12. However, more than half of these died, resettled elsewhere, 
or returned to the United States. See id. at 12–13. African Americans were 
soon eclipsed by other groups. From 1827 to 1847, the majority of people 
arriving in Liberia were “recaptured” Africans, who had been taken as slaves 
but never made it to another continent. See id. at 52–53. After the slave trade 
was abolished in the United Kingdom and the United States, these nations 
would routinely intercept slave ships and return them to Africa. Id. Large 
numbers of these recaptured Africans were dropped off in Liberia, regardless 
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govern and defend themselves.
21
 The settlers declared their 
independence on July 26, 1847 and subsequently ratified a 
constitution.
22
 
The 1847 Constitution was heavily influenced by the U.S. 
Constitution
23
 and clearly favored the settlers or “Americo-
Liberians.”
24
 Only “Negroes” could be citizens, only citizens 
could own property, and only property owners could vote.
25
 
Despite constituting a majority of the population,
26
 indigenous 
people were classified as “Aborigines,” rather than “Negroes,” 
and were ineligible for citizenship.
27
 Most Liberians were 
“excluded from participation in their government and in their 
court system.”
28
 
 
of their country of origin. See id. at 53. Liberians referred to these people as 
“Congos.” Id. Many “Congos” were able to assimilate into the American 
Liberian culture and most were granted citizenship in the later Republic of 
Liberia. Id. at 54. The distinction between the two groups has lessened with 
time. Id. 
 21. See id. at 17. This was prompted by the difficulties Liberia had 
defending its interests. Other nations had viewed Liberia as a privately owned 
settlement with no claim to sovereignty. Therefore, they refused to submit to 
Liberian customs and taxes. The United States did not consider Liberia a 
colony and declined to intervene in its disputes. See id. at 14–17. 
 22. Id. at 17–20. There were several “constitutions” prior to 1847; 
however, these were often organizational frameworks promulgated by the 
ACS. See id. at 14–16. Even the Constitution of 1839, an improvement over its 
predecessors with regard to democratic participation, gave the ACS authority 
to appoint the president. Id. at 16. 
 23. See id. at 19.  A Harvard law professor wrote the draft Constitution 
that the ACS forwarded to the convention.  It established three branches of 
government patterned after those found in the United States. 
 24. Id. at 20. 
 25. Id. “Negros” included Americo-Liberians and Congos.  See id. at 54. 
 26. Dube, supra note 5, at 577 (explaining that indigenous groups 
accounted for more than ninety percent of the population). 
 27. PHAM, supra note 4, at 20.  Indigenous Liberians did not receive the 
right to vote until 1946.  Abdul Rahman Lamin, Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation:  Analysis of the Prospects and Challenges of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in Liberia, in A TORTUOUS ROAD TO PEACE: THE 
DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL, UN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTIONS IN LIBERIA, 229, 232 (Festus Abogye & Alhaji M S Bah eds., 
2005), available at http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/TORTUOUSCHAP10. 
PDF. Even then, indigenous Liberians did not necessarily have full property 
rights. The 1956 Code of Laws made clear that indigenous tribes’ land was 
public land used with the permission of the central government. The land 
could convert to private ownership only when the tribe became “sufficiently 
advanced in civilization”.  PHAM, supra note 4, at 63. 
 28. Dube, supra note 5, at 577.  The Monrovia ruling class generally 
ignored the indigenous population until European colonial powers threatened 
Liberia’s territory. The government then began to think about how to 
effectively occupy the indigenous areas. See PHAM, supra note 4, at 59. 
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From 1847 to 1980, the Americo-Liberians tightly 
controlled the government and monopolized political power.
29
 
Their political party, the True Whig Party, maintained its 
control through a powerful system of political patronage.
30
 
During this time, the government provided little access to 
formal justice for most of the population.
31
 In the early 
twentieth century, Liberia began to recognize the authority of 
tribal chiefs; however, that recognition was often dependent on 
the chiefs implementing the policy of Monrovia.
32
 In 1905, 
Liberia established the Hinterland Regulations — statutory 
law created to govern the “uncivilized” indigenous population.
33
 
The Hinterland Regulations gave traditional chiefs limited 
authority to interpret and enforce the regulations as local 
laws.
34
 This essentially created two justice systems: one for 
Americo-Liberians, and the other for indigenous Liberians.
35
 
Monrovia not only established the regulations, it controlled 
their enforcement. Corporal punishments ordered by tribal 
courts would not be enforced unless approved by government 
officials, and fines imposed by tribal courts would go to the 
Board of Revenues for all cases except those involving a breach 
of local custom.
36
 The government also began to regulate 
customary practices, requiring some practitioners of traditional 
justice to be licensed.
37
 Eventually, Monrovia transitioned from 
 
 29. Dube, supra note 5, at 577; see also Jamie O’Connell, Here Interest 
Meets Humanity:  How to End the War and Support Reconstruction in Liberia, 
and the Case for Modest American Leadership, 17 HARD. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 210 
(2004). 
 30. Lamin, supra note 27, at 231. 
 31. See Pajibo, supra note 6, at 16. 
 32. PHAM, supra note 4, at 59–60. Monrovia is the capitol of Liberia and is 
used synonymously with the ruling class.  Monrovia had been the center of 
power from the beginning of Liberia.  Outlying settlements complained that 
the 1847 Constitution concentrated power in Monrovia and made no provision 
for local government. Id. at 19. 
 33. Rawls, supra note 7, at 106. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Gerald H. Zarr, Liberia, in AFRICAN PENAL SYSTEMS 191, 197 (Alan 
Milner ed., 1969). 
 37. See id. at 196. Trial by ordeal of a “minor nature” that did not 
endanger life was allowed for a period of time; however, the Department of the 
Interior regulated the process. An “ordeal doctor” would have to pass tests 
given by the Department of Interior to confirm his “competence and skill.” 
After passing the tests, he would be given a certificate allowing him to 
practice. Eventually, “minor” trial by ordeal was illegal. See also Rawls, supra 
note 7, at 103 (discussing how, in 1940, the Supreme Court declared all forms 
of trial by ordeal unconstitutional). For a further discussion of trial by ordeal, 
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regulating tribal justice to supplanting it. By 1963, Liberia had 
abolished the concurrent criminal jurisdiction of the tribal 
courts, seeking to avoid a dual justice system.
38
 
Despite Monrovia’s attempt to regulate and then eliminate 
them, tribal justice systems continued. Indigenous Liberians 
sought justice from customary leaders and continued with 
traditional justice practices that predated the arrival of the 
Americo-Liberians.
39
 The Liberian government undermined 
traditional justice practices by intervening in the selection of 
traditional leaders, removing communities from their 
traditional lands, and maintaining the formal justice system.
40
 
All of this contributed to the growing unrest. 
The tension between the Americo and indigenous Liberians 
ultimately led to a violent uprising in the late twentieth 
century that sparked years of violence and civil war.
41
 On April 
12, 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel Doe came to power in a 
military coup.
42
 Doe, a member of the Krahn ethnic group, 
became the first indigenous leader of Liberia.
43
 However, 
instead of ending the system of patronage, Doe continued it, 
with Krahns replacing the Americo-Liberians.
44
 Doe not only 
promoted Krahns to important government positions, he also 
 
see the section titled “The Customary Justice System” below. 
 38. Zarr, supra note 36, at 196. In 1969, Liberian Law Professor Gerald H. 
Zarr predicted that the chiefs would “continue to exercise jurisdiction in minor 
criminal cases for a few years until the legislation [ending the concurrent 
jurisdiction] [could] be strictly enforced.” Id. However, tribal court jurisdiction 
did not easily go away. The law that repealed the Hinterland Regulations was 
itself repealed in 1973. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has republished the 
Hinterland Regulations since then, as late as 2001. However, the regulations 
violate multiple provisions of the Liberian constitution, and multiple Supreme 
Court decisions and acts of the legislature have declared most of the 
Regulations illegal or obsolete. It remains unclear whether the Regulations 
are the law.  Rawls, supra note 7, at 106–107. 
 39. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 16 (describing the justice mechanisms in “pre-
settler Liberia” and explaining how Liberians continued to use them). Pajibo 
goes on to describe the role of customary leaders in these processes.  Id. at 16–
22.  For a further discussion of traditional justice mechanisms, see the section 
titled “The Customary Justice System” below. 
 40. Id. at 16. The components of the “dual justice system” Pajibo refers to 
are the formal and customary systems. Id. at 23. The components are 
discussed in detail in the section titled “Overview of the Dual Justice System” 
below. 
 41. Id. at 8–11. 
 42. Dube, supra note 5, at 577. 
 43. Lamin, supra note 27, at 233. 
 44. See id. 
Compton Article 2/27/2014  6:11 PM 
2014] LESSONS OF RULE OF LAW IN LIBERIA 55 
 
brutalized civilians from other indigenous ethnic groups.
45
 His 
actions ultimately precipitated civil war. 
In 1989, rebel forces led by Charles Taylor invaded Liberia 
from Cote d’Ivoire.
46
 The rebels, primarily composed of ethnic 
Grios and Manos who had been targeted by Doe,
47
 “tapped into 
popular anger at Doe’s repression and ethnic discrimination” 
and began to slaughter Krahns.
48
 The rebels splintered into 
various factions.
49
 One group captured Doe, and a Palestinian 
journalist filmed them torturing Doe to death.
50
 After Doe’s 
death, rebel groups continued to vie for power.
51
 Despite 
repeated peace talks and the presence of a regional African 
peacekeeping force, the nation descended into violence.
52
 At 
least seven major Liberian factions fought a civil war, which 
spread through at least eighty percent of the nation’s 
territory.
53
 
In 1995, the most powerful Liberian warlords signed a 
treaty and agreed to form a transitional government.
54
 The 
transitional government arranged for elections, and in 1997 
Charles Taylor was elected president.
55
 As President Taylor 
consolidated power and violently silenced dissent, Liberia 
crumbled.
56
 In 2000, Liberian exiles in Guinea attacked Liberia 
 
 45. O’Connell, supra note 29, at 211 (“Doe gave political meaning to ethnic 
differences within the indigenous population for the first time, creating ethnic 
rivalries that would contribute to the later war.”). Even though Krahns 
constituted less than five percent of the population, under Doe they held one-
third of government posts and commanded every infantry battalion in the 
army. PHAM, supra note 4, at 83. 
 46. O’Connell, supra note 29, at 212. Taylor was a former official in Doe’s 
government who had fled to the United States after being accused of stealing 
public funds. PHAM, supra note 4, at 94–95.  He spent fifteen months in a U.S. 
prison but escaped before he could be extradited to Liberia. Id. at 95. He 
eventually returned to Africa, built a base of support, and launched his 
invasion. Id. at 95–98. 
 47. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 9. 
 48. O’Connell, supra note 29, at 212. 
 49. Id. 
 50. PHAM, supra note 4, at 104–08. 
 51. See id. at 109–16 (explaining continued conflicts among Liberian 
armed factions such as the NPFL, AFL, and ULIMO). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 116. 
 54. See id. at 124–27 (explaining the process of the Abuja agreement and 
the faction leaders who participated in the agreement). 
 55. Id. at 131–34. 
 56. See id. at 177–80 (explaining how the Taylor government turned 
Liberia’s military into a private army, tortured and killed political opponents 
and critics, and silenced independent media outlets, and suggesting that, at 
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in an attempt to overthrow Taylor, and the second phase of the 
civil war began.
57
 The fighting continued until Taylor, 
surrounded by his enemies, fled the country in 2003.
58
 
In August of 2003, the major parties to the conflict signed a 
peace agreement.
59
 Two months later, the United Nations 
established a peacekeeping force: the United Nations Mission 
in Liberia (UNMIL).
60
 National elections were held two years 
later, and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected president.
61
 
President Sirleaf faced the challenge of rebuilding a formal 
justice system, which had been decimated by fourteen years of 
war, and strengthening the anemic rule of law in rural areas.
62
 
The rebuilding of the formal justice system was a continuation 
of Liberia’s longstanding desire to unite the nation under a 
Western formal justice system; it was not a direct response to 
the abuses committed during the civil war, which were 
addressed by Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
63
 
The vast majority of Liberians had little access to justice 
during Doe’s rule and the subsequent civil war.
64
 This lack of 
access, however, existed before Doe.
65
 Historically, Liberia 
failed to provide access to formal justice to most Liberians; 
therefore, the majority of Liberians have sought justice through 
traditional mechanisms.
66
 Liberians continued to seek 
traditional justice despite the government’s efforts to regulate 
and eliminate tribal justice practices.
67
 This has resulted in the 
entrenched dual justice system that still exists today. 
 
 
the same time, Liberia’s economy shrank in real terms and crime was 
rampant). 
 57. O’Connell, supra note 29, at 216–17. 
 58. Id. at 217–18. 
 59. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 11. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Flomoku & Reeves, supra note 6, at 44 (“The justice system that 
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf inherited when she came to office in 2006 was 
in tatters.  Particularly in rural areas, police and magistrates were largely 
unpaid and unregulated, and were often operating in their own interests.”). 
 63. See Pajibo, supra note 6, at 12–13 (discussing the formation and 
purposes of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission).  This and other 
transitional justice issues are outside the scope of this paper. 
 64. Id. at 16. 
 65. See id. (explaining Liberians’ lack of access to justice and how military 
dictatorship exacerbated it). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. at 16–24. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE DUAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
Liberia has two systems of justice that operate 
simultaneously: the formal system and the customary system.
68
 
The formal system is a Western-style adversarial justice 
system that prioritizes individual rights and punitive 
sanctions.
69
 Nevertheless, it is often inaccessible, time 
consuming, expensive, backlogged, and too combative for most 
Liberians.
70
 The customary system uses traditional methods 
and prioritizes restorative justice and social reconciliation.
71
 
While the majority of Liberians prefer the customary system,
72
 
it raises concerns among legal scholars about separation of 
powers, due process, human rights, and gender equality.
73
  
 
A. THE FORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
The formal justice system consists of state-sanctioned 
courts, prosecutors, and other legal actors.
74
 Its authority stems 
from the Liberian Constitution, statutes, and common law,
75
 
and it is based on the U.S. justice system.
76
 
The formal system has its strengths. There are clear 
crimes and punishments,
77
 as well as procedures to protect due 
 
 68. Luccaro, supra note 12.  Dividing the justice system into two pieces, 
formal and customary, is an oversimplification.  The reality is complex.  
Certain chiefs and customary actors are sponsored by the state.  Other 
customary actors are informal leaders whose power comes through community 
recognition.  Liberians can also seek justice through elected representatives, 
government officials, NGOs, former military commanders, and persons of 
influence.  ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 76.  However, understanding this 
reality, the entire justice system can generally be divided into formal (based 
on the constitution, operated by the government, and consistent with the 
Americo-Liberian approach) and customary (based on traditional sources of 
authority and practices, and consistent with the indigenous Liberian 
approach) elements.  That approach will be used in this paper. 
 69. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 3–4. 
 70. U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, supra note 13, at I.D. 
 71. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 3–4. 
 72. Id. 
 73. U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, supra note 13, at I.C.1. 
 74. Luccaro, supra note 12. 
 75. Rawls, supra note 7, at 109, n.2. 
 76. Dube, supra note 5, at 577 (explaining how the source of Liberia’s 
codified law was American common law); Rawls, supra note 7, at 110, n.30 
(explaining how Liberia’s 1986 Constitution, the current constitution, is 
loosely patterned on the U.S. Constitution). 
 77. See, e.g., An Act to Amend the New Penal Code Chapter 14 Sections 
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process.
78
 Its protections for human rights, children’s rights, 
and gender equality are consistent with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration of the Rights 
of the Child.
79
 At times, the consequences meted out by the 
formal system can be more effective than traditional 
approaches. For example, in “The Case of the Unreturned 
Goat,” Professor Peter Sevareid describes a case where the 
formal system was able to stop a plaintiff’s overly litigious 
behavior.
80
 The formal court used its coercive power, including 
the threat of confinement, to stop the plaintiff and force him to 
pay his court fees.
81
 In this case, a formal court better served 
the defendant than a traditional justice practice.
82
 
However, the formal system also has pronounced 
weaknesses. The system has a “bewildering array of fees,” lacks 
transparency and impartiality, and is ineffective at enforcing 
judgments.
83
 It is “plagued by rampant corruption and 
inaccessibility” and is chronically slow: ninety-six percent of 
detainees in the formal system are in pretrial confinement,
84 
which can last years.
85
 A 2009 study by the United States 
 
14.70 and 14.71 to Provide for Gang Rape, LIBERIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS (Jan. 17, 2006), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs 
/ELECTRONIC/85440/95667/F367499794/LBR85440.pdf (demonstrating the 
specificity with which a crime is defined under the Liberian Penal Code). 
 78. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF LIBERIA Oct. 19, 1983, ch. III, art. 20a (“No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, security of the person, property, 
privilege or any other right except as the outcome of a hearing judgment 
consistent with the provisions laid down in this Constitution and in 
accordance with due process of law.”). 
 79. See, e.g., International Development Law Organization, Women’s 
NGO Secretariat of Liberia, Strengthening the Legal Protection Framework for 
Girls in India, Bangladesh, Kenya and Liberia -- Liberia Country Report 23-45 
(2010) (explaining how formal Liberian law has taken progressive steps 
towards protecting women’s property rights and against child labor, slavery, 
human trafficking, and child sexual exploitation).  These protections are 
consistent with international human rights standards. See Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, ¶¶ 2, 4, 17, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/; 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV) A, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/1386(XIV) (Dec. 10, 1959), http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus 
/humanrights/resources/child.asp. 
 80. Peter Sevareid, The Case of the Unreturned Goat:  Dispute Resolution 
by a Mano Court in Liberia, 7 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 61, 75 (1993). 
 81. Id. at 72–75. 
 82. Id. at 75. 
 83. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 3, 46. 
 84. Luccaro, supra note 12. 
 85. While in Liberia, this author attended formal court hearings in three 
rape cases and observed firsthand the slow speed of the formal system.  
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Institute for Peace (USIP) and George Washington University 
(GWU) found that “the formal system is seen almost 
universally by Liberians as falling abysmally short of their 
expectations in [affordability, accessibility, and timeliness].”
86
  
Even the formal system’s basic structure is a weakness in 
Liberia. Formal courts are adversarial with a clear winner and 
loser, creating bitterness and ongoing hostility among 
Liberians.
87
 The defendant’s right to appear before a Circuit 
Court judge often allows a defendant to escape liability unless 
the plaintiff is wealthy.
88
 Additionally, the concept of “evidence-
based due process” is foreign to rural leaders, who often rely on 
traditional methods such as trial by ordeal to determine guilt 
or innocence.
89
 
 
B. THE CUSTOMARY JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
The customary justice system is based on the norms and 
values of traditional Liberian culture.
90
  It “often operates 
without state sanctioned authority.”
91
 However, the state 
 
Defendant One had been in pretrial confinement for three years.  The 
government was unable to produce sufficient evidence to indict him and the 
court released him on bail.  Defendant Two had been in pretrial confinement 
for two years.  The government was unable to produce sufficient evidence to 
indict him; the court dismissed the charges and released him.  Defendant 
Three had been in pretrial confinement for eleven months.  As part of a plea 
agreement, he pled guilty to a four count indictment and was sentenced to an 
additional seven months of confinement.  Observations of Circuit Court, in 
Monrovia Liberia (June 28, 2012). 
 86. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 3. 
 87. Sevareid, supra note 80, at 75 (discussing how “[i]t is unlikely that 
good feelings between the parties will easily be renewed” after formal 
litigation.).  This is problematic in Liberia where harmonious community 
relations are often more important than the vindication of individual rights. 
 88. Magistrate Court is often the court of first instance for minor cases. 
However, defendants have the absolute right to have their case heard before a 
Circuit Court judge, even in minor cases. Some defendants strategically 
exercise this right and force plaintiffs to continue their suit in Circuit Court 
where the court and lawyers’ fees are higher. Many plaintiffs cannot afford the 
higher fees and are unable to continue with their suit.  Interview with James 
Cooper, Magistrate Judge of West Point, in Monrovia, Liberia (July 9, 2012). 
 89. Flomoku & Reeves, supra note 6 at 45. Trial by ordeal is a method of 
justice that uses a physical process, often a dangerous act, to determine guilt 
or innocence. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 17. For a further discussion of trial by 
ordeal, see the section titled “The Customary Justice System” below. 
 90. Luccaro, supra note 12. 
 91. Id. 
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recognizes and occasionally sponsors certain elements.
92
  While 
specifics vary throughout the country, there are some common 
practices including the kola nut, palava hut, and trial by 
ordeal.
93
 
The kola nut is a justice method focused on forgiveness.
94
  
To resolve a dispute, the guilty party provides kola nuts to the 
wronged party as atonement.
95
  Cash, animals, and other 
commodities may be used in place of kola nuts.
96
  The exact 
payment is determined by local elders.
97
 
The palava hut process is a justice method rooted in 
mediation and dialogue.
98
  The individual parties to a dispute, 
often with and sometimes represented by their families, meet 
under the supervision of community elders.
99
  Depending upon 
the accusation and the result of the mediation, the elders may 
require restitution, payment of medical expenses, or even 
banishment from the community.
100
  There is often a period of 
 
 92. See UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA — LEGAL AND JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM SUPPORT DIVISION, CASE PROGRESSION:  ASSESSMENT / CAPACITY 
DEVELOPMENT OF TRIBAL GOVERNORS’ COURT 9-19 (2011) [hereinafter UNMIL 
CASE PROGRESSION] (discussing the role and functioning of the Tribal 
Governors Court). Liberian law recognizes Tribal Governors as 
representatives who may investigate tribal matters and resolve disputes. Id. 
at 9. Of the Tribal Governors interviewed by UNMIL, 62% reported being on 
the government’s payroll. Id. at 13. Additionally, the Liberian Constitution 
creates a place for customary law and values. See CONSTITUTION OF LIBERIA 
Oct. 19, 1983, ch. VII, art. 65 (“The courts shall apply both statutory and 
customary laws in accordance with the standards enacted by the 
Legislature.”); ch. II, art. 5 (“The Republic shall . . . preserve, protect and 
promote positive Liberian culture, ensuring that traditional values which are 
compatible with public policy and national progress are adopted and developed 
as an integral part of the growing needs of the Liberian society.”)  Notably, the 
Constitution makes those laws and values subservient to legislation, public 
policy, and national progress.  
 93. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 16–23. Pajibo points out that forcible 
displacement and government involvement may have undermined the 
legitimacy and appeal of these processes. Nevertheless, these customary 
processes are still used. 
 94. Id. at 16. 
 95. Id. at 16–17. Kola nuts are chestnut-size nuts that are grown in the 
forests of West Africa. They have been a commodity for centuries, and are a 
sign of hospitality and affluence for the wealthy. Paul E. Lovejoy, Kola in the 
History of West Africa, 20 CAHIERS D'ÉTUDES AFRICAINES 97, 97 (1980). 
 96. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 16–17. 
 97. See id. at 17. 
 98. While the palava hut process is used throughout Liberia, the specifics 
vary between linguistic and ethnic groups. Id. at 18–22. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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grieving, a shared meal, a public apology, and an 
acknowledgement of forgiveness.
101
  The palava hut process is 
used to settle conflicts ranging from land disputes to 
murders.
102
 
Trial by ordeal is a method of justice that uses a physical 
process, often a dangerous act, to determine guilt or 
innocence.
103
  A community may force the accused to drink a 
poisonous mixture, touch red-hot metal, or simply wear straw 
tied around his neck.
104
  The result of the ordeal (whether the 
accused regurgitates the drink, gets burned by the metal, or the 
straw spontaneously tightens around the accused’s neck) 
indicates guilt or innocence.
105
  Trial by ordeal can also be used 
as a pledge to tell the truth. Kafu is a trial by ordeal process 
where the parties to a dispute share a common meal or drink of 
water.
106
  It is believed that if a person later lies during the 
proceeding, the food or water will sicken him.
107
  Liberians often 
refer to trial by ordeal as “sassywood” after the tree they have 
historically used for poison.
108
 
The customary system has noticeable strengths. It provides 
“an accessible, affordable and efficient means of resolving 
disputes”
109
 rooted in restorative justice and social 
reconciliation.
110
  Customary processes are accessible to most 
Liberians and their judgments are respected.
111
  Settlements in 
the customary system are more likely to produce “harmony” 
and lasting peace between parties.
 112
  Customary methods are 
generally cheaper; even though processes like the kola nut 
require the party at fault to make a payment, there are no 
attorney’s fees.
113
 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 17. 
 104. Id. at 17. See also ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 60 (describing a 
variety of trial by ordeal techniques). 
 105. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 17.  
 106. Rawls, supra note 7, at 105. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id.; P.T. Leeson & C.J. Coyne, Sassywood, 40 J. COMP. ECON. 608, 612 
(2012). 
 109. U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, supra note 13, at I.B.2. 
 110. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 4. 
 111. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 23-24 (identifying these as strengths of the 
palava hut process). Even sassywood, which is illegal, is widespread. Id.at 17–
18. 
 112. Sevareid, supra note 80, at 75. 
 113. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 16–17. 
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However, the customary system also has clear 
weaknesses.
114
  Customary courts have difficulty resolving 
egregious cases.
115
  They are often ineffective or unfair when the 
parties are from different communities, ethnic groups, or 
religions.
116
  Justice for the victim is important but is not the 
primary concern, and social reconciliation often takes precedent 
over individual compensation.
117
  This can lead to troubling 
results. UNMIL’s 2011 report on the Tribal Governors’ Courts 
was sparked by a report of a Tribal Governor fining a man $48 
USD for “deflowering” a woman.
118 
 In the formal system the 
man could have been charged with rape and sentenced to ten 
years in prison.
119
  Some customary processes are illegal, 
limiting appellate and state enforcement options.
120
  Further, 
trial by ordeal raises significant concerns about self-
incrimination, legal representation, and due process.
121
 
The customary system also raises concerns about gender 
equality. Many tribes have customary laws that make 
distinctions between men and women.
122
 These laws often treat 
adult women as minors, and do not allow women to inherit 
property from their fathers or their husbands.
123
  These 
customary practices deviate from the formal system’s 
 
 114. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 4. 
 115. Id. at 5. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 4. 
 118. UNMIL CASE PROGRESSION, supra note 92, at 7. In this case, both 
parties agreed to have the case heard in the customary system by the Tribal 
Governor. 
 119. Id. In Liberia, the maximum sentence for second degree rape is ten 
years. The maximum sentence for first degree rape is life imprisonment. First 
degree rape requires a minor victim, gang rape, serious or lasting injuries, or 
the use of a deadly weapon. An Act to Amend the New Penal Code Chapter 14 
Sections 14.70 and 14.71 and to Provide for Gang Rape (Dec. 29, 2005), 
Paragraph 4, available at http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org/uploads/Liberia%20-
%20Rape%20Amendment%20Act.pdf. The facts surrounding the allegation in 
the UNMIL report are brief, but do not appear to support a first degree 
charge. 
 120. See e.g. Rawls, supra note 7, at 104–105 (tracing the legality of trial by 
ordeal and noting that the Liberian Supreme Court reiterated in 2005 that all 
forms of trial by ordeal are unconstitutional). 
 121. Id. at 104 (quoting the Liberian Justice Minister’s explanation of the 
judiciary’s position on trial by ordeal).  
 122. Susan H. Williams, Democracy, Gender Equality, and Customary Law:  
Constitutionalizing Internal Cultural Disruption, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL. 
STUD. 65, 81 (2011). 
 123. Id. 
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constitutional and statutory rights to equality.
124
 
Finally, the customary system’s structure raises concerns 
about the separation of powers. Tribal chiefs are overseen by 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is part of the executive 
branch.
125
  Therefore, chiefs who adjudicate cases are arguably 
executive officers taking on a judicial role.
126
  This is especially 
problematic when the tribal chiefs’ decisions are not subject to 
judicial review.
127
  Unfortunately, the Liberian Constitution, 
legislation, and Supreme Court decisions provide inconsistent 
guidance on this issue.
128
 
 
C. LIBERIANS’ VIEWS OF THE TWO JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
 
Liberia’s elite legal practitioners prefer the formal 
system.
129
  These are most often Americo-Liberians; however, 
the group also includes indigenous Liberians who were 
educated in the United States.
130
  Generally speaking, Liberians 
who have the ability to shape legal policy have a strong sense of 
respect for the formal system and courts.
131
  They believe that 
the formal system has the power to change the beliefs and 
behaviors of Liberians, and that it will inevitably surpass the 
customary system.
132
  As a practical matter, many Liberians 
choose the formal system when they believe their wealth, 
connections, or status will give them an advantage over their 
opponent.
133
 
However, even if the formal system worked smoothly for all 
classes of Liberians, most say they would still be unsatisfied 
with it.
134
  Most Liberians value reconciliation, believing that 
bad behavior stems from damaged social relationships.
135
  To 
them, adjudication through the formal justice system, an 
adversarial system that focuses on winners and losers, will only 
 
 124. U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, supra note 13, at I.C.1. 
 125. Rawls, supra note 7, at 96–97. 
 126. See U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, supra note 13, at I.C.1. 
 127.  Id. 
 128. Rawls, supra note 7, at 100–02. 
 129. See id. at 95. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, supra note 13, at I.D.3. 
 134. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 3. 
 135. Id. at 3–4. 
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further damage these relationships.
136
  This emphasis on 
repairing relationships is not always a mere preference; it is 
often a matter of necessity in rural agrarian communities 
where neighbors are economically dependent on one another.
137
  
While the formal system is focused on individual rights, many 
Liberians view the term “human rights” negatively.
138
  They 
connect the term with the rights of children and defendants, 
and perceive those rights as “undermining the social order.”
139
  
Many view formal courts as “inherently more coercive and 
authoritarian”
140
 and much more susceptible to corruption than 
traditional methods.
141
  They see the formal system as merely a 
way for the wealthy and powerful to promote their interests.
142
  
Even traditional leaders who see value in the formal system 
believe the customary system is their only practical choice.
143
 
Because of these opinions, most Liberians choose not to 
have their cases heard in the formal justice system.
144
  In fact, 
as few as three percent of civil cases and two percent of 
criminal cases are heard in a formal court.
145
  Liberians 
generally believe that expanding the jurisdiction of tribal chiefs 
would reduce crime, even if the tribal chiefs were prohibited 
from using trial by ordeal.
146
  Liberians’ confidence in the tribal 
chiefs stems from the belief that chiefs would look for the “root 
 
 136. Id. at 4. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Id. at 5. 
 139. Id. (“Children’s rights are understood as encouraging children to sue 
their parents and preventing them from working, which to rural Liberians is 
an affront to social values and has serious economic implications. To 
Liberians, whose conception of justice is about truth and reconciliation, rather 
than an adversarial process, defendants’ rights are seen as giving an unfair 
advantage to perpetrators at the expense of the victims.”). 
 140. Sevareid, supra note 80, at 74–75. 
 141. U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, supra note 13, at I.D.3. 
 142. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 3. 
 143. See Luccaro, supra note 12 (explaining that traditional leaders are 
open to change and appreciate the many advantages of a formal justice 
system. However, they believe that policymakers do not listen to them and do 
not appreciate their position. According to the traditional leaders, traditional 
methods of justice, including trial by ordeal, are “the product of a rational 
effort to make the most of the economic and social positions they inhabit.”). 
 144. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 4. 
 145. Id. at 4, app. (discussing a study conducted in 2008 and 2009 by the 
Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford University). The study 
concluded that 38 percent of civil cases and 45 percent of criminal cases were 
heard in informal forums; the remaining cases were heard in no forum at all. 
Id. at 4. 
 146. Id. at 87. 
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causes” of problems, bring social pressure to enforce decisions, 
and focus on reconciliation and reducing social conflict.
147
  
However, many Liberians believe that trial by ordeal should be 
allowed in some form, and see its ban as an attack on their 
culture and the reason for increased lawlessness.
148
 
 
D. UNDERSCORING THE DIFFERENCES BY EXAMINING RAPE 
 
The differences between the two justice systems, as well as 
Liberians’ differing perceptions of each, may be underscored by 
examining rape. Liberians view rape as a serious issue.
149
  
However, the two systems of justice address rape in 
dramatically different ways. The formal system identifies rape 
as a crime and focuses on punishing the rapist.
150
  However, the 
customary system often views rape as a problem between 
families, not simply individuals.
151
  The families may “talk 
through” the rape and resolve the matter with payment, 
marriage, or some other settlement designed to make the 
victim’s family whole.
152
 
Currently, Liberian law gives the formal system exclusive 
jurisdiction over rape cases,
153
 and most Liberians agree that 
certain forms of rape, such as violent rape or the rape of a child, 
are best addressed in a punitive fashion by formal courts.
154
  
However, Liberians prefer customary remedies for “less 
egregious” forms of rape and continue to turn to tribal chiefs to 
adjudicate rape cases.
155
 This broad preference appears to be 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 5 (“The vast majority of Liberians we interviewed believe 
strongly that at least some forms of trial by ordeal . . . should be allowed, and 
raised very serious concerns that the ban on its use is causing significant 
societal problems -- most particularly the inability to control crime and a rise 
in witchcraft.”). 
 149. Id. at 66 (explaining that “women and men both identify rape as a 
significant local problem.”). 
 150. Flomoku & Reeves, supra note 6, at 44. Such rape laws are relatively 
new in Liberia. See Sara K. Cummings, Comment, Liberia’s “New War”:  Post-
Conflict Strategies for Confronting Rape and Sexual Violence, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
223, 236 (2011) (explaining that rape, other than gang rape, was not 
criminalized in Liberia until 2005). 
 151. Flomoku & Reeves, supra note 6, at 44. 
 152. Id. 
 153. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 66. 
 154. Id. at 6, 46. Additionally, repeat offenses may be seen as “beyond 
social repair” and deserving of referral to the formal system. Id. at 30. 
 155. See id. at 6, 70. 
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shared by Liberian women as well. The 2009 USIP and GWU 
study found “no evidence that when chiefs do intervene to 
resolve [rape] cases they [do] so in ways . . . that are 
unsatisfying to women.”
156
 That finding “stands in rather 
marked contrast to the very vociferous and explicit statements 
of dissatisfaction with the outcomes for rape cases produced by 
the formal system.”
157
 While acknowledging the need for further 
research into whether customary solutions to rape are effective 
for Liberian women, the study’s authors observe: 
 
While the [formal] rape law may reflect the way 
policymakers believe Liberian women should think 
about rape, its consequences, and its remedy, our data 
at the very least casts some doubt on assumptions 
that it actually strikes a balance that local Liberian 
women believe to be the right one for realizing a sense 
of justice for rape victims.
158
 
 
One potential reason for Liberians’ preference for 
customary resolutions to rape cases is the dysfunctional state of 
the formal justice system. Both men and women believe that 
the formal system does not adequately address rape cases, 
formal rape laws are not effective deterrents, and that rapists 
“generally get off with impunity.”
159
 There is also a perception 
that formal justice system officials commit sex crimes 
themselves.
160
 Additionally, the formal system’s fees are often 
prohibitively high. Victim “fees” include paying for police 
transportation costs, the accused’s prison food, a variety of 
police and court administrative expenses, and even the paper 
used for depositions.
161
 Even violent rapes which result in death 
do not progress through the formal courts unless someone 
continues to pay the “fees.”
162
   
This combination of dysfunction and corruption is 
dramatically illustrated in the USIP and GWU’s report of the 
 
 156. Id. at 88. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Certain social realities may influence these views, including the 
survival-based need for interactions with the perpetrator’s family and the 
community, the likelihood of successful prosecution in a formal court, and the 
costs of using the formal court system. Id. at 88–89. 
 159. Id. at 66–67. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 40. 
 162. Id. 
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case of an eighty-three year old woman named Lofa: 
 
A man raped an eighty-three-year-old woman. The 
woman was taken to the hospital where the rape was 
confirmed, and the suspect was arrested and jailed. 
The victim’s daughter went to the magistrate court to 
pursue the case, but she was told that she had to pay 
five hundred Liberian dollars. After she did, she was 
told to get a second medical report. The case was then 
referred to the circuit court. After traveling a second 
time to the circuit court in Voinjama, they were told 
that it was the end of the term and they would need to 
come back the next term. The next term, there was no 
transportation available and it was the rainy season. 
The victim was put in a wheelbarrow for transport, 
but as her health was failing, her daughter decided to 
bring her mother home and to go to the court herself. 
Once there she was told that unless her mother was 
present the court would not hear the case. The next 
day she was told by the court that the suspect had 
broken out of jail. In the meantime, while she was at 
the court, her mother died.
163
 
 
Another potential reason Liberians prefer customary 
resolutions to rape is the adversarial nature of the formal 
justice system. Even in rape cases, Liberians often view social 
reconciliation as more important than punishment per se.
164
 
They fault the formal system for narrowly focusing on the 
criminal act without considering broader social factors.
165
 In 
rural Liberian life, reconciliation is more than a mere 
preference. Continuing interaction with the perpetrator’s 
family and the broader community can be a matter of 
survival.
166
 For rural Liberian women, “a greater emphasis on 
social reconciliation and restoration may prove to be quite 
rational calculations.”
167
 
 
III. POST-WAR RULE OF LAW REFORMS 
 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 48. 
 165. Id. at 70. 
 166. Id. at 89. 
 167. Id. 
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Since the civil war, a large amount of work and 
international support has gone into strengthening the formal 
justice system.
168
 However, the average citizen has benefited 
little from these reforms, especially outside of Monrovia.
169
 
Policymakers in Liberia and nations around the world often 
assume that a uniform justice system will strengthen the rule 
of law and avoid the past injustice.
170
 Some seek to abolish the 
customary system and have only a formal system.
171
 Ironically, 
reforms which have limited the customary courts’ jurisdiction 
may have inadvertently decreased justice on the local level.
172
 
Furthermore, most rural Liberians reject the idea that the laws 
of Monrovia or the international community should replace or 
override their customary practices, and see such reform efforts 
as a power grab by the Monrovian elite.
173
  Interestingly, they 
reject these reforms without rejecting the ultimate authority of 
the national government or the need for the formal system in 
their community.
174
 
Recently, Liberian policy makers changed their approach 
and began seeking ways to ease the tension between the two 
justice systems. In 2008, reform-minded lawyers and scholars 
created the Liberian Legal Working Group (LWG).
175
 The LWG 
met multiple times during 2009 to discuss justice reform and 
Liberia’s dual justice system.
176
 In addition to internal 
 
 168. Flomoku & Reeves, supra note 6, at 44 (describing the work as 
including “training judges, magistrates, prosecutors and public defenders; 
renovating court buildings; and regularising salaries.”). 
 169. Id. 
 170. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 71. 
 171. Id. 
 172. When the formal system is not a credible alternative, many Liberians 
believe that restrictions on the customary system lead to injustice. Id. at 5. 
(“Our data suggests that to the extent that local Liberians view the formal 
system as less comprehensible and more susceptible to corrupt influence than 
customary alternatives, the limitation of the customary courts’ jurisdiction is 
seen as actually diminishing the degree of transparency, accountability, and 
integrity of local justice.”) Id. at 85. 
 173. Id. at 71–72. 
 174. As discussed above, most Liberians believe that the formal system is 
the appropriate forum to address certain crimes, such as the rape of a child. 
However, they reject the idea that the formal system, as a rule, should replace 
or override their customary practices. Id.  
 175. The LWG was convened by UNMIL, USIP, and the Carter Center, at 
the request of individuals from various organizations including the Ministries 
of Justice and Internal Affairs, the judiciary, the Liberian bar, a Liberian law 
school, and a variety of nongovernmental organizations. See Luccaro, supra 
note 12.  
 176. See id. 
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discussion, the group met with the Traditional Leadership 
Council, which represents and promotes the interests of 
traditional leaders.
177
 The LWG formally adopted findings on 
December 10, 2009.
178
 It found that the dual justice system 
remained a reality for Liberians years after the civil war.
179
 The 
customary system continued largely the same as before the war 
and was common in rural communities.
180
 Additionally, the 
strengths and weaknesses of the two justices systems remained 
the same.
181
 
However, the LWG went beyond restating the tensions in 
the dual justice system: it established guiding principles for 
reform.
182
 The group stated that future reforms should focus on 
improving the quality of justice for all Liberians rather than 
merely the structure of the legal system.
183
 Policies should be 
realistic, not just in terms of available resources but also in 
light of the social realities of how Liberians view justice.
184
 
Policy makers should consider the impact of justice reforms on 
broader nation-building goals and encourage more local 
participation.
185
 The group proposed reevaluating jurisdiction 
laws, potentially allowing traditional courts to resolve more 
civil and criminal cases.
186
 They also concluded that justice 
should be broader than penal sanctions and should incorporate 
restorative remedies.
187
 Finally, the LWG declared that the 
government should work to understand the purposes and local 
perceptions of “onerous practices,” such as trial by ordeal, 
before imposing a ban.
188
 
 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id. 
 179. U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, supra note 13, at I.A.1. 
 180. Id. at I.B.1. 
 181. The LWG found the customary justice system to be focused on the 
concerns of Liberians, accessible, affordable, effective, based on social 
reconciliation, and preferred. See id. at I.B. However, the customary justice 
system raised concerns about separation of powers, due process, human rights, 
and gender equality. Id. at I.C.1. The formal justice system lacked resources 
and was inaccessible, time consuming, expensive, and severely backlogged. 
See id. at I.D. Liberians viewed the formal system as susceptible to corruption, 
favoring the elite, and too adversarial. Id. at I.D.3, I.D.5. 
 182. See id. at II. 
 183. Id. at II.A. 
 184. Id. at II.B. 
 185. Id. at II.D. 
 186. Id. at III.A.1. 
 187. Id. at III.A.2. 
 188. Id. at III.A.3. 
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The LWG findings were given to the Justice Minister and 
four regional meetings were convened to discuss further 
reform.
189
  Representatives of all fifteen counties in Liberia 
were present, including members of the government, judiciary, 
and traditional leaders.
190
  Similar issues were identified at all 
four meetings, including the need to give traditional leaders an 
official role in the formal justice system.
191
 These meetings laid 
the groundwork for the National Conference held in April of 
2010—”Enhancing Access to Justice: A Review of Our 
Customary and Statutory Systems.”
192
  The purpose of the 
National Conference was to create recommendations on how 
the two justice systems could work together and both be 
strengthened.
193
  Participants, including government officials, 
civil society representatives, and traditional leaders, discussed 
a variety of topics including trial by ordeal and women’s 
rights.
194
  Participants created a long list of recommendations, 
including giving traditional chiefs an official role in the formal 
justice system as advisors to prosecutors on customary 
resolutions for criminal cases, allowing alternative forms of 
oath-taking that were consistent with traditional beliefs and 
constitutional rights, and writing down customary law so it can 
be evaluated and even applied by formal courts.
195
  A Post-
Conference Review Committee summarized the conference’s 
recommendations for use by the Law Reform Commission 
(LRC).
196 
 As of 2012, discussions on linking the formal and 
customary justice systems were on-going in the LRC and the 
Committee on the Role of Non-Lawyers (CRNL).
197
 
 
 189. Rawls, supra note 7, at 92–93. 
 190. Id. at 93. 
 191. Id. at 94. 
 192. See id. at 97. The conference was co-hosted by the Ministry of Justice, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Supreme Court. Id.  
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 97–98. 
 195. Rawls, supra note 7, at 98–100. 
 196. Id. at 97–99. The LRC is responsible for “streamlining the law reform 
and review process in Liberia, ensuring that the process is participatory and 
responsive to the needs of Liberia.” Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory 
Service, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, The Liberia 
Law Reform Commission, Five Year Strategic Plan and Its Impact, JUST. REV., 
June 2012, at 22, 22. 
 197. Flomoku & Reeves, supra note 6, at 46. The CRNL, with the 
assistance of international and non-governmental organizations, is examining 
the laws and regulations that govern rural areas with an eye towards eventual 
constitutional reform. Liberia: Policy Dialogue and Reform, THE CARTER 
CENTER, http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/conflict_resolution/liberia-policy-
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The work of the LWG, regional meetings, National 
Conference, LRC, and CRNL is more than bureaucratic 
window-dressing; the discussions of these groups demonstrate 
a fundamental change in mindset. As she opened the National 
Conference, Liberia’s Justice Minister stated: 
 
[L]aws are rooted in the values and beliefs of a people 
and therefore the enactment of any legislation must 
take into account socio-cultural realities; we cannot 
continue to ignore the desire of our people to have 
customs and traditions recognized by the formal 
justice system, but we must do so being mindful that 
it is imperative to apply rules and principles that are 
fair and just, and show respect for human dignity.
198
 
 
Several traditional leaders participating at the National 
Conference remarked that they felt as though they were being 
listened to for the first time.
199
  Notably, participants did not 
“simply present a list of grievances, but engaged in 
brainstorming possible concrete policy solutions.”
200
 
Trial by ordeal highlights the differences in this new 
approach. Liberia’s formal justice system has opposed trial by 
ordeal for almost a century.
201
 Traditional leaders, however, 
continue to view trial by ordeal as the only effective tool for 
combating witchcraft, which they perceive to be an underlying 
source of the wrongdoing in their communities.
202
 While well-
intentioned, the government’s ban on trial by ordeal actually 
“deteriorated the state’s legitimacy in the minds of many 
 
dialogue-reform.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). According to an associate 
director of the Carter Center, a non-governmental organization working with 
the CRNL, such reforms “help ensure that any new laws stand a better chance 
of being both consistent with Liberia's reform agenda, existing laws— 
including Liberia's international human rights obligations—and the realities 
of community traditions and practices, as far as this is possible.” Id. 
 198. Rawls, supra note 7, at 96 (quoting Justice Minister C P Tah’s speech 
delivered at the opening of the National Conference). 
 199. Id. at 97. 
 200. Id. 
 201. In 1916, the Supreme Court outlawed trial by ordeal that results in 
death. In 1940, the Court declared all forms of trial by ordeal unconstitutional. 
While, the Hinterland Regulations of 2001 permit non-dangerous trial by 
ordeal, the Supreme Court again declared all trial by ordeal to be 
unconstitutional in 2005. Id. at 104.  
 202. Luccaro, supra note 12. 
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Liberians.”
203
  Many concluded from the ban that the state 
protected or even participated in witchcraft.
204
  To combat this 
perception, the National Conference recommended 
distinguishing “good sassywood” from “bad sassywood.”
205
  Some 
forms of trial by ordeal, such as Kafu, where the parties pledge 
to tell the truth by sharing a common meal or a drink of water, 
are physically harmless and resemble oaths.
206
  Officially 
recognizing these methods could increase the public’s faith in 
the formal judicial system.
207
 
 
IV. ANALYSIS: FROM IMPOSITION TO CONSIDERATION 
 
Liberia’s history and experience with rule of law reform 
lead to two key conclusions. First, the imposition of a Western 
justice system has been a source of conflict in Liberia and has 
not strengthened the rule of law. Second, recent efforts to 
consider the reasons and values behind the customary system, 
rather than merely focusing on its elimination, have eased 
tensions and shown great potential for strengthening the rule 
of law in Liberia. 
 
A. IMPOSING A WESTERN JUSTICE SYSTEM HAS BEEN A 
SOURCE OF CONFLICT IN LIBERIA AND HAS NOT 
STRENGTHENED THE RULE OF LAW 
 
The history of Liberia’s justice system has been one of 
imposition. The Americo-Liberian settlers initially created a 
formal justice system only for themselves.
208
 As the indigenous 
population became part of the nation, the ruling class did not 
seek their perspective on justice. Rather, the government 
regulated customary courts and practices in an attempt to 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. Rawls, supra note 7, at 105. The LWG also discussed this. See 
Luccaro, supra note 12 (explaining that one member of the LWG noted that 
“[w]hile there are certainly onerous methods of trial by ordeal that deserve 
restriction, they are not necessarily representative of the entire spectrum of 
traditional behaviors.”). 
 206. Rawls, supra note 7, at 105. National Conference participants 
wondered if Kafu was any different than taking an oath in court. However, 
Rawls emphasizes that such truth-telling rituals must be balanced with due 
process. Id. at 105, 108. 
 207. Id. at 105. 
 208. See Dube, supra note 5, at 577. 
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bring them in line with formal standards.  Eventually, the 
government banned customary courts and practices all 
together.
209
 This imposition of the formal system reinforced the 
differences between the Americo-Liberian ruling class and the 
indigenous population and directly contributed to the growing 
social unrest that eventually led Liberia to civil war. 
After the civil war, the imposition continued. The Liberian 
government, along with the United Nations, United States, and 
other international partners, focused on strengthening the 
formal justice system and eliminating customary practices that 
they deemed onerous. While their focus on due process and 
human rights was commendable, their actions created more 
tension. Indigenous Liberians, having experienced 150 years of 
imposition from Monrovia, viewed the elimination of customary 
practices as another power grab by the central government and 
its foreign allies. 
Some may argue that tension is a price worth paying to 
strengthen the rule of law; because if the formal system 
strengthens rule of law in the long run, it is worth imposing 
even if the transition is difficult. However, while the formal 
system has strengths, its imposition has not strengthened the 
rule of law in Liberia.
210
 
First, the formal system does not function effectively 
enough to strengthen the rule of law. All members of society 
are not held accountable to the law because the system is 
corrupt. Courts are not transparent as to why litigants are 
charged fees, and parties use their wealth and power to 
influence judges.
211
  Laws are not equally enforced because the 
system lacks the resources to function in many parts of the 
country. A system in which ninety-six percent of detainees are 
in pretrial confinement
212
 is not consistent with international 
human rights standards. Forcing Liberians to use such a 
dysfunctional justice system does not strengthen the rule of 
law. 
Second, even if the formal system functioned efficiently, its 
 
 209. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text.    
 210. In addition to the two arguments below, it may be argued that the 
conflict created by imposition itself undermined the rule of law. The violent 
coups, public executions, and ethnic violence of the civil war are the antithesis 
of the rule of law. 
 211. See Rawls, supra note 7, at 94 (discussing corruption as a key finding 
in the four regional pre-conference meetings). 
 212. Luccaro, supra note 12. 
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imposition would not strengthen the rule of law because many 
Liberians would lose their only practical source of justice as 
they understand the term. Most Liberians who seek justice use 
the customary system.
213
 It provides a reconciliation-based 
approach that is consistent with their values and practically 
meets their needs. The government’s bans on customary 
practices and imposition of the formal system have not changed 
this. Rather, bans and imposition have taken away the only 
practical justice option for a majority of Liberians. Without a 
customary system, these Liberians turn to underground 
customary practices or give up on seeking justice altogether.
214
 
This is why trial by ordeal continues in the shadows despite the 
government ban, why Liberians still seek customary 
resolutions to rape despite laws giving formal courts exclusive 
jurisdiction, and why over half of Liberian civil and criminal 
cases are never heard in any kind of forum.
215
  A policy of 
imposition does not promote international human rights 
standards, but rather incentivizes injustice. By acknowledging 
these realities, Liberia’s new approach strives to avoid this 
danger. 
 
B. RECENT EFFORTS TO CONSIDER THE REASONS AND 
VALUES BEHIND THE CUSTOMARY SYSTEM, RATHER 
THAN MERELY REGULATING OR ELIMINATING IT, HAVE 
EASED TENSIONS AND SHOWN GREAT POTENTIAL FOR 
STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW IN LIBERIA 
 
As demonstrated by the work of the LWG, National 
Conference, LRC, and CRNL, Liberia has changed its approach 
to rule of law reform. The government is listening to the 
perspectives of traditional leaders and considering the socio-
cultural realities that have shaped the customary system.
216
 
This stands in clear contrast to the government’s pre-LWG 
approach which merely considered the customary system’s 
regulation or elimination. This new approach has not changed 
 
 213. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 4, 97 (discussing a Centre for the Study 
of African Economies at Oxford University study which found that three 
percent of civil cases and two percent of criminal cases were heard in formal 
courts, thirty-eight percent of civil cases and forty-five percent of criminal 
cases were heard in informal forums, and the remaining cases were heard in 
no forum at all). The study was conducted in 2008 and 2009. Id. app. at 97. 
 214. Id. at 4–6. 
 215. Id. at 4–6, 70. 
 216. See supra, notes 197–200 and accompanying text. 
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Liberia’s desire for a Western formal system that meets 
international standards; the nation is not condoning all 
traditional practices or incorporating them into the formal 
system. However, the new approach of integrating the opinions 
of local leaders and some traditional customs has eased 
tensions and has great potential for strengthening the rule of 
law in Liberia.
217
 
First, Liberia’s new approach is easing tensions because it 
breaks from the nation’s history of imposition. For indigenous 
Liberians, rule of law reform has historically meant that they 
are on the receiving end of decisions from the central 
government. Liberia’s new approach breaks from this past by 
giving indigenous Liberians a role in the reform process and 
truly listening to what they are saying.
218
 Now that the 
indigenous Liberians participating in the reform process feel 
listened to, they view Monrovia as a partner rather than an 
opponent. Differences can now be acknowledged and openly 
discussed, rather than feeding resentment and escalating into 
ethnic conflict. 
Second, Liberia’s new approach focuses on the underlying 
values and needs of Liberians. The majority of Liberians have 
long preferred the customary system because it is consistent 
with their values of social reconciliation and truth telling. It 
also practically meets the needs of rural agrarian communities. 
When customary practices were banned, many Liberians felt as 
if their values and way of life were under attack. However, 
when Monrovia looked at the customary system it did not see 
those values and needs. Rather, it saw a system devoid of due 
process that used superstitious ideas to reach arbitrary results 
in violation of basic human rights.
219
 This difference in 
perspective was a source of continual tension. Now, the 
government is meeting with traditional leaders, listening to 
their values, and considering the socio-cultural realities of 
rural Liberia. The emphasis has shifted from whether a 
particular custom, such as trial by ordeal, should be banned, to 
how the value behind that custom (the need for a public, 
unequivocal commitment to telling the truth) can be respected 
in the formal system in way that is consistent with 
international human rights standards.
220
 Further, rather than 
 
 217. See supra, notes 197–200 and accompanying text.   
 218. See Rawls, supra note 7, at 97.  
 219. See U.S. INST. FOR PEACE supra note 13, at I.C.1.  
 220. See Rawls, supra note 7, at 104–05 (discussing Liberia’s past efforts to 
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merely criticizing the results of customary processes (a rapist 
being fined 48 dollars), the government is considering how the 
formal system can better function in the reality of tribal life 
(the victim and perpetrator’s families must continue to farm 
together to survive). This new approach eases tensions because 
the government is now considering what is truly important to 
most Liberians. 
Finally, Liberia’s new approach has great potential for 
strengthening the rule of law because it unites the entire 
population behind a single effort to establish a functional and 
modern justice system. As the government listens to their 
perspective, indigenous Liberians are increasingly open to 
cooperation.
221
  Additionally, now that underlying values are 
openly discussed, the government is better able to explain how 
the formal system upholds those values. Further, the 
cooperation of both sides will allow the government to address 
the formal system’s structural weaknesses. As discussions 
continue and reforms are enacted, indigenous Liberians will 
become progressively more comfortable with and invested in 
the formal system. Ultimately, this will facilitate Liberia’s 
transition to a unified formal system that upholds its 
population’s values in a way that is consistent with 
international human rights standards. Such a system, which 
all Liberians respect and to which all Liberians are 
accountable, will significantly strengthen the rule of law.  
Imposing a Western justice system has been a source of 
conflict in Liberia and has not strengthened the rule of law.  
However, recent efforts to consider the reasons and values 
behind the customary system, rather than merely regulating or 
eliminating it, have eased tensions and shown great potential 
for strengthening the rule of law.  Beyond these conclusions, 
Liberia’s history and experience with rule of law reform provide 
valuable lessons for future rule of law missions in other 
nations. 
 
V. LESSONS FROM LIBERIA FOR FUTURE RULE OF 
LAW MISSIONS 
 
 
ban trial by ordeal and recent discussions as to how some physically harmless 
forms of trial by ordeal, such as Kafu, are similar to oaths and could have a 
place in the formal justice system).   
 221. See id. at 97 (discussing how the National Conference led to the 
parties “brainstorming possible concrete solutions.”).  
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Liberia’s history and experience with rule of law reform 
provide valuable lessons for reformers in other nations. While 
each situation is different, Liberia’s journey illustrates the 
importance of understanding a nation’s history, the potential 
for rule of law imposition to be counterproductive, and the 
value in avoiding the either/or approach. The United States 
and its partners should consider these lessons when planning 
future rule of law missions. 
 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF HISTORY 
 
A population’s view of rule of law reform may be shaped by 
centuries old conflicts. Populations that have endured 
colonization may be suspicious of Western justice systems. 
Further, nations with a history of civil conflict or coups may 
view reformers as simply the latest strongman to take control. 
These perceptions will impact the willingness of a population to 
accept rule of law reforms. To overcome this, reformers need to 
effectively demonstrate that “rule of law” is not a buzzword 
used to justify a power grab; rather, it is a commitment to 
holding everyone accountable to the same rules. 
 
B. IMPOSITION CAN BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE 
 
Strengthening the rule of law takes time and concerted 
effort. It is tempting for a reform-minded government to simply 
ban old practices and mandate a modern system, or for 
international partners to condition their support on immediate 
reforms. While this may work in certain circumstances, it may 
prove counterproductive in others. Populations with deeply 
ingrained justice traditions may resist reform, especially if the 
new system is dysfunctional, misunderstood, or ill-suited for 
their needs. Mandating the new system will not lessen this 
resistance.  Rather, it may encourage people to ignore the law 
and seek underground traditional practices, or give up on 
seeking justice altogether. This does not strengthen the rule of 
law. To overcome this, reformers should consider socio-cultural 
realities as they design and implement reforms. This may mean 
a longer reform process; however, successful reform may be 
impossible without it. 
 
C. AVOIDING THE EITHER/OR APPROACH 
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Often, reform minded governments and their international 
partners approach the rule of law with an either/or mindset. 
Either the nation will continue with outdated practices or it 
will embrace modern standards. With an eye to due process and 
human rights, the reformers understandably want to ban the 
old and mandate the new. However, this approach results in 
imposition which may be counterproductive to the reformers’ 
goals. 
Rule of law reform does not have to take the either/or 
approach. Certainly, some traditional practices are 
incompatible with international standards. However, even 
onerous practices may be rooted in values that are consistent 
with due process and human rights. Reformers should seek to 
understand traditional values, link those values to the modern 
system’s values, and, when possible, structure the modern 
system in a way that respects traditional beliefs. A population 
will be more inclined to give up its traditional practices when 
the new justice system supports its underlying values. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The United States, along with the United Nations and 
other international partners, will almost certainly be involved 
in future rule of law missions. What approach will they take?  
How can they realistically encourage reform while maintaining 
their commitment to the rule of law and human rights?  
Liberia’s experience provides some helpful lessons. While there 
are onerous customary practices that rightly deserve to be 
eliminated, mandating their elimination and imposing a 
modern system may lead to conflict and ultimately undermine 
rule of law reform. Alternatively, seeking the values behind 
customary practices is a good way to encourage a unified effort 
towards a justice system which all respect and to which all are 
accountable.  
 
